Detection overview

Detection deep-dive

Option 1: Country-specific biosurveillance

Option 2: Metagenomic sequencing technology roadmap

Option 3: Rapid individual testing

AI x Biosecurity

Prevention overview

Prevention deep-dive

Option 1: AI safeguards

Option 2: DNA synthesis screening

Option 3: Preventing irrevocable bioweapon uplift

Option 4: Governance of risky biological research

Intro

The history of pandemics and bioweapons

The future of pandemics and bioweapons?

Towards a pandemic-proof world

[Optional] Biology 101 for biosecurity

[Optional] Biosecurity overviews

Rapid MCM overview

Rapid MCM development deep-dive

Option 1: Faster R&D

Option 2: Clinical trials innovation

Option 3: Better financing and procurement

Option 4: Faster manufacturing and delivery

Your next steps

Choose your focus

Biosecurity project ideas

Create your 1-pager

Next steps: Technical fellowships

Next steps: Policy fellowships

Next steps: Career resources

Next steps: Programs

NPI overview

NPI deep-dive

Option 1: Pandemic-proof PPE

Option 2: Biohardening indoor spaces

**The best way to limit damage from a pandemic is to prevent it from happening in the first place.**

In this unit you'll explore interventions to prevent engineered pandemics, either through accidental release from a lab or a deliberate biological attack. We choose this focus because there is evidence that biorisk posed by advances in AI and synthetic biology have the potential to be substantial, are changing rapidly and there are tractable interventions to address them.

We don't explore the prevention of naturally-occurring pandemics (e.g. disease spillover from animals to humans) in this section. If you want to learn more about this, [this paper](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01312-y) is a good place to start. The material in later units on detection and response apply to all pandemic threats, regardless of origin.

We'll come back to this choice in our group discussion. Bakerlee's piece below makes the strongest case for why we've made it.

We'll start this unit by exploring what AI models can and cannot currently do, how we try to measure this and how rapidly these capabilities are improving.


Four intervention layers, idea to deployment. Read a short piece on each, then pick one to deep-dive.

**AI safeguards**

_Interventions at the AI model level include refusal training, scaffolded output filters, and biorisk evaluations._

**Nucleic acid synthesis screening**

_Nucleic acids (DNA and RNA) are the genetic 'instructions' that make us who we are. They are also what defines all viruses, bacteria and other pathogens. A bad actor could come up with a dangerous DNA sequence on a computer, but it would need to be 'printed' (synthesised) to cause harm in the real world. How can we screen DNA orders to guard this interface between the digital and physical worlds?_

**Preventing irrevocable bioweapon uplift**

_Some research makes it much easier to build catastrophic biological weapons without significant benefit to humanity. Where the line is drawn between too harmful to do or not is hotly contested in some areas, while broadly agreed upon in others._

**Governance of risky biological research**

_There can be benefits to doing research with dangerous pathogens. Trying to design vaccines or treatments for malaria, HIV or TB would be difficult without the relevant virus! However there may be research on engineered pathogens where the benefits do not outweigh the risks (e.g. of a lab leak or novel information that could assist a bioterrorist). Key terms you'll see here are 'Gain-of-function' (GoF) research, 'Dual-Use Research of Concern' (DURC) and 'Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential' (PEPP)._


Pick 1 of the following 4 interventions to dive deeper into. We've given you some resources on the following pages as a starting point.

- **Option 1: AI safeguards**
- **Option 2: DNA synthesis screening**
- **Option 3: The Biological Weapons Convention**
- **Option 4: Governance of risky biological research**

Aim to answer the following questions:
- What are the intended goals of this intervention?
- What is the current state of this intervention, and to what extent is it achieving its goals?
- What are the most critical holes in this intervention?
- What are they key challenges to implementing a more robust version of this intervention, and how could you overcome them?

You will bring the results of your research to share in your group discussion.


Some research makes it much easier to build catastrophic biological weapons without significant benefit to humanity. Where the line is drawn between too harmful to do or not is hotly contested in some areas, while broadly agreed upon in others.


Biosecurity

Option 4: Governance of risky biological research

Resources