Build an organization whose mission is to effectively raise US public support for biodefense.

## **Stakes**
Frontier AI systems will increase technological capability in every scientific field, including biology. This will advance new techniques and medicines, but may also make it easier for bad actors to engineer dangerous new biological weapons. Natural pandemics will remain a significant threat, and the chances of an engineered pandemic will increase over time.

In a worst-case scenario pandemic, society is in danger of breaking down slowly during a long-term lockdown as food and supplies dwindle, or breaking down quickly without access to integral infrastructure like healthcare or defense.

Medical countermeasures prevent a long-term lockdown, as do improvements to healthcare and defense infrastructure, including stockpiles of respirators that protect critical workers.

These things are dependent on government funding, which is in turn dependent on public opinion.

This means shaping public opinion, though it might seem distant from the problem, could be one of the single biggest levers for preventing societal collapse in the event of a bioweapon attack.

## **Context**
Certain elements of a strong biodefense plan cost an amount of capital substantially greater than current philanthropic and private sources are able to supply. This includes research and development of the medical countermeasures that will allow society to return to normal from a lockdown scenario, and well-defended stockpiling of important protective equipment that allows our critical workers to function. For instance, it is estimated that the [US should spend $340M/yr on respirator stockpiles](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XAfw9XHltgjDEIjVkKpyStaGdGbZbL6ss3PO6G6EGY4/edit?tab=t.gphxdsc7qzoc), and the [development costs for a novel medical countermeasure can quickly approach $1B.](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK603192/) Though this will increase significantly soon with the advent of the OpenAI Foundation and other new capital sources, total global philanthropic biodefense funding is currently on the order of $100M/yr.

The government is capable of moving this capital. In 2020, the Trump admininstration led the most successful rapid medical countermeasure campaign in history: Operation Warp Speed. For [~$18 billion dollars](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-10-29/inside-operation-warp-speed-s-18-billion-sprint-for-a-vaccine), Operation Warp Speed took a vaccine from sequence to distribution in under a year, saving lives and reopening the economy. Much of the capacity that made it possible is now being [wound down](http://cancerletter.com/cancer-policy/20250808_5c/), including [capacity added post-COVID](https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/white-house-empties-office-us-pandemic-policy-gaps-left-behind).

The next biological threat we face may not be a natural pandemic, especially as the tools to bioengineer a dangerous pathogen improve and become cheaper.

This should be considered a national security issue rather than a public health issue. A country that cannot produce its own countermeasures and depends on foreign supply chains is a country that has outsourced its own defense to potential adversaries. Moreover, if we cannot supply and protect our preparedness stockpiles, we will be unable to sustain basic critical function in the event of a severe bioweapon attack.

Unfortunately, investment in biodefense, especially medical countermeasures like vaccines, has become strongly politicized and linked to unrelated issues. Getting the right information to voters and raising or lowering the salience of the issue may help shift this outlook and get US voters to either prioritize biodefense or at least stop voting against it.

## **Target End-State**
Within ~6-12 months of a founder starting, an organization exists whose sole mission is to effectively better inform US public opinion on biodefense and turn resulting changes into action. This team has already helped 50 members of the public talk to their elected officials, in person, to raise the salience of biodefense.

## **Owner Profile**
This can be led by a driven generalist with the ability to hire out expertise.

The ideal owner profile:
- Strong media background.
- Trustworthy.
- Ideally personal ties to relevant groups.

## **Initial Scoping**
**First 3 Months**
- Talk to existing advocates.
- Run a hiring process and build a small team.
- Start talking to the people you want to convince.

**Key Questions**
- Is media the most effective way to do this?
- What is the root cause of the current sentiment, and how could this have been avoided?
- What information are people most lacking?
- Who are the highest-leverage audiences?
- Who should deliver the message?

## **Funders and Partners**
**How much money is behind this?**
A [wave of philanthropic capital](https://nanransohoff.substack.com/p/the-third-wave-of-american-philanthropy) is soon to be available for founders looking to work on important problems like biosecurity. The OpenAI Foundation, for instance, is part of an estimated $37–100B/year in new AI-lab-driven giving. Existing philanthropic capital is also significant. Coefficient Giving alone deploys over $100M per year to biosecurity.

**Potential Funders**
[Coefficient Giving](http://coefficientgiving.org/)
[BlueDot Impact](http://bluedot.org/)

**Potential Partners and Stakeholders**
[Institute for Progress](http://ifp.org/)
[RAND](https://www.rand.org/)

## **Learn More**
[Pew Research Center — Americans' Confidence in Scientists](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2026/01/15/americans-confidence-in-scientists/)
[KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor](https://www.kff.org/covid-19/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-dashboard)
[KFF Public Opinion](https://www.kff.org/topic/public-opinion/)
[Exploring the complexities of vaccine sentiment among healthcare and public health professionals: essential strategies for encouraging vaccine uptake](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12098589/)

## Interested in building this?
Contact: Olivia Scharfman, [olivia@bluedot.org](mailto:olivia@bluedot.org).


US Public Support for Biodefense